La coopération euro-africaine continue à se concevoir à travers la seule Méditerranée. Experts et analyste se focalisent sur cette mer dans toutes leurs études autour des relations entre l’Europe et l’Afrique.

Cette vision écarte l’océan Atlantique qui, pourtant, constitue une autre liaison entre les deux continents. L’espace euro-atlantique englobe 23 pays africains et 12 pays européens dont sept directement atlantiques et cinq qui le sont via la mer du Nord ; en tout, un ensemble de 35 pays liés par des liens historiques, politiques, économiques, environnementaux et sécuritaires.

L’importance de l’Atlantique est historiquement reconnue dans les relations entre l’Europe et l’Afrique, aussi bien pour ce qui relève des échanges entre les deux continents qu’en ce qui concerne les mouvements socio-politiques.

De plus, la construction d’une telle zone de coopération renforcerait l’aire méditerranéenne, et entamerait un processus de relations nouvelles entre le Nord et le Sud de l’Atlantique ; une relation qui jusqu’ici n’était qu’horizontale entre l’Est et l’Ouest de l’Atlantique. Les Européens sont préoccupés par la sécurité de certains pays atlantiques de l’Afrique, en raison du terrorisme sahélien qui cherche un accès à la mer et menace de plus en plus les pays côtiers d’Afrique de l’Ouest d’une part, et les menaces que pose la piraterie maritime en Golfe de Guinée d’autre part. Maritimisation des échanges mondiaux, littoralisation du peuplement, ou encore mobilité et organisation des flux migratoires sont des facteurs qui jouent en faveur de la construction d’un espace géopolitique de coopération. Dans une telle configuration, il faudrait penser l’espace atlantique euro-africain en parallèle à celui des Amériques du Nord et du Sud. Deux espaces dont la jonction créerait une aire atlantique propice au développement et aux échanges et pouvant rivaliser avec les ambitions d’autres régions du monde.

• Un tel concept conforterait-il l’initiative marocaine d’un espace afro-atlantique ?
• Faudrait-il penser le concept de manière graduelle dans chaque continent avant de penser l’Atlantique dans sa totalité ou, au contraire, faut-il le penser dès le début dans son entièreté ?
• Comment relier les espaces méditerranéen et atlantique dans les relations euro-africaines ?

As detrimental as COVID-19 was in terms of human and economic losses, one of the aspired silver lining was for pandemic to act as a catalyst for major reforms such as a massive energy transition movement, as the global response to the virus showed that governments can respond resolutely and forcefully when faced with an existential threat. The pandemic coincided with renewed perception of urgency regarding global warming as major environmental catastrophes took place during the period spanning 2020-22 including heatwaves, wildfires, water and food shortages, ongoing massive species extension... Furthermore, the international community hoped that if political action remained lethargic, that the market would be enough to spur change: the crisis negatively impacted demand for fossil fuels and stock market valuations of oil and gas companies, so much so that The Economist predicted the end of the oil age and the instauration of the “new energy order”.

Energy prices started rising mid-2021 as the world economy picked up and restrictions were eased. However, another calamity stroke in Europe with the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine in February 24th 2022. Fears over Russian energy exports cut offs, especially natural gas, exacerbated spikes in energy commodities worldwide, threatening energy security. Countries were split between immediate fixes to energy price-driven inflation, accelerating production to ease demand and long-term energy transition policies and targets. The discussion on energy transition is caught again between contextual and diplomatic matters, risking policy flip-flopping and unruly back and forth policies. As energy transition cannot be reached in autarchy, nor be implement under the same scheme for every country, a dialogue surrounding leveling commitment to unlock the energy transition is of the essence.

• How is the current spike lived by different economies of the Atlantic?
• To what degree has the question of energy sovereignty encouraged the transition?
• How does the narrative surrounding fossil fuels as mere commodities changed since the outbreak of the war, seeing as though we live in a completely globalized world?

La pandémie de Covid-19 et la récente crise déclenchée par la guerre en Ukraine ont entraîné d'importantes perturbations dans les chaînes de valeur mondiales (CVM), en plus d'une augmentation des prix des commodités, à la suite d'un choc d'offre négatif et d'une hausse vertigineuse des coûts du fret maritime. Ces chocs négatifs ont remis en question le rôle de la fragmentation des chaînes d'approvisionnement dans l’intégration de l'économie mondiale. La conception de la politique industrielle historiquement dominante, fondée sur la fragmentation des chaînes de valeurs mondiales en vue d'une optimisation des coûts, était justifiée par le grand développement de la logistique et des transports dans les pôles industriels mondiaux, ce qui a permis à la fabrication "just-in-time" de devenir le principal modèle de production adopté. Cependant, la perturbation des chaînes logistiques après l'avènement de ces crises a multiplié les voix appelant à une révision du modèle actuel d'organisation des chaînes de valeurs, en faveur d'un reshoring ou un nearshoring, évoluant ainsi vers un modèle de production "just-in-case". Cette session discutera les différents arguments soulevés à la fois contre et en faveur d'un reshoring ou d'un nearshoring de la production pour minimiser les risques géopolitiques et économiques.

• Le débat sur la viabilité d'une politique industrielle fondée sur la fragmentation des chaînes d'approvisionnement mondiales a-t-il surgi suite à la crise du Covid-19, ou était-il présent bien avant ?
• Quelle politique industrielle mettre en place pour gérer l'arbitrage entre efficacité de production et résilience face aux chocs ?
• Peut-on dire qu’une forte indépendance d’une économie sur les CVM représente un risque de vulnérabilité face aux chocs ?

In many ways, 2022 will prove to be a seminal year in the global context. The world order is at an inflection point. International relations and alliances are dynamic and fluid. Trends discerned during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic have deepened and are reinforced by the war in Ukraine in Eastern Europe. Sanctions imposed on Russia will have consequences which will reverberate around the world. All countries will be affected; none more so than the countries of the Global South who will be among those most impacted. While debate is taking place among countries of the North about all aspects of the disruptive forces at play in the current period, the Global South needs to advance its own views and secure its interests.  The stakes are high. Current events and their impacts will affect the collective future, and countries of the South have an obligation to protect their own interests by contributing solutions and policy prescriptions regarding how best to navigate the turbulence ahead, manage and mitigate worse effects, and turn the current crisis into an opportunity to engage in meaningful conversation around collaborative North-South efforts aimed at action, genuine partnerships and cooperation aligned to the interests of the Global South.

• Is this a hinge moment in the evolution of the world order?  Are new alliances emerging or deepening? Are new actors emerging on the world stage? How will these affect the Global South?
• How are different regions of the world, India, Africa, Turkey, South East Asia, Latin America and others, accommodating and balancing changes in the global order? What interests are at stake? What might some of the challenges and opportunities look like?
• In this period of crises and their cumulative impacts, what are the implications for post-COVID-19 recovery and sovereign debt issues? For food and energy security?  Might this be the moment for greater resolve among countries of the Global South in securing their strategic interests through greater cooperation?  What actions can be taken?
• What policy and other recommendations can be offered to advance initiatives aimed at navigating the turbulence ahead, mitigating the worse effects and securing the interests of the Global South? How can the current crisis be seized as an opportunity to engage in North-South efforts at meaningful action, genuine partnerships and cooperation?

The intersection of energy poverty, conflict risk and climate vulnerability to demonstrate the peace dividends of clean energy cannot be ignored. As a result, there is strong need to expand the renewable energy revolution to the most vulnerable populations in Africa, notably where United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are present to enforce peace and development nexus.

With multiple peacekeeping missions in Africa, the UN should invest in renewable energy infrastructure to shift from climate unfriendly diesel generators. This will contribute to providing electricity to local communities and enhancing economic development, to build UN's legacy among local population when the mission leaves. More importantly, access to electricity would ease some of the local grievances driving ongoing conflicts in parts of Africa.

• What are the peacekeeping missions in Africa today? And how much do they cost financially?
• What are the sources of energy for the peacekeeping missions in Africa?
• How investing in renewable energy could contribute to achieving stability and peace? 
• How investing in renewable energy could play key role in UN peacekeeping missions’ legacies?  

In 2013, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initially One Belt One Road (一带一路), as a strategy for investment in global infrastructure that has included approximately 150 countries to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe, by land and maritime networks. BRI intends to improve regional integration and increase trade and economic growth. Through BRI, China has sought to increase its leadership role in global affairs and to reflect its new status as a rising power. If fully implemented, BRI should boost global GDP growth by as much as USD 7 trillion by 2040.

The Southern Atlantic has been a target for BRI, particularly considering that many countries in the region still lack major infrastructure networks to boost economic growth and productivity. Hence, by improving infrastructure and transportation, China aims at enhancing international trade with the Southern Atlantic as the United States and the European Union are seen to be lagging behind Beijing. Brussels has labelled China a cooperation partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival, while Washington recognizes Beijing as a strategic competitor.

• How has BRI helped consolidate China’s rising status as a global power?
• What have been the positive and negative impacts and deliverables of China in the Southern Atlantic?
• Has BRI forced Western countries to increment their investment levels in the developing world? Have the US’ Build Back Better World or the EU’s Global Gateway been able to counter China’s growing influence as an investment partner in the Southern Atlantic?

In 2050, Africa will be home to at least one-quarter of the world’s population. This anticipated demographical shift means the continent will have stronger influence not only on world politics, but also on the global economy (market?). With a sizable voting bloc in the United Nations, an increasingly active youth, and important resources across the continent, Africa is fully aware of its crucial role in shaping tomorrow’s world. However, concrete and efficient change on a global level means countries are expected to express their genuine will to join efforts and revitalize global partnership programs. The Biden administration has recently come forward with a set of strategies aiming to revamp the US-Africa partnership and provide both parties with a framework to address common challenges and pursue joint goals and interests. This new approach aims to break away from traditional narratives that often describe this partnership as a unilateral project that fails to acknowledge and address current concerns of African leaders and policymakers. This session will thus discuss the new orientations of the American foreign policy towards the continent to assess its alignment, or not, with Africa’s compelling development needs.

• To which extent does the traditional “North/Sub-Saharan Africa” lens used by the US reflect the diversity of the continent and how does that impact both its public diplomacy and the efficiency of its regional strategies?
• How can both parties promote a more inclusive approach aiming to expand and re-define the notion of “civil society” to encourage the participation of small and medium-sized business owners along with researchers and other influential actors?
• Will mobilizing private capital be enough to fund climate adaptation projects and infrastructure needs in Africa?
• How can the two partners promote a fast mineral-based industrialization that is both sustainable and profitable

The US's retreat from Afghanistan and the war of Ukraine put the spotlight on the role that UE should play in the task of restructuring the international system, in the most appropriate combination of the EU strategic autonomy project issued from the Versailles declaration and the 'soft' power inherent to the EU process. An economic giant and geopolitical dwarf, the dilemmas of European construction have for a long time fantasized its status as a world superpower. However, the war in Ukraine has given birth to a fundamental geopolitical shift in EU external action, prefiguring the emergence of a geopolitical Europe.

Today, the Indo-Pacific space is in the process of becoming the new center of global gravity, to the detriment of the Atlantic space, which has shaped global geopolitics since the age of great discovery. While the war in Ukraine has caused major distortions in the European energy and food supply chains, and unlocked more progress on EU strategic autonomy, the North Atlantic partnership is now enabled to influence a world of more diffuse power, greater interdependence and intensified global competition. Countries in the South Atlantic are already being lured by China and Russia, even though they are well placed to fit the North Atlantic value-chains and economic networks.

Given the transnational and comprehensive nature of the new challenges as well as the present reform of its foreign policy, the EU could prove useful in enlisting the cooperation of the other actors bordering the Atlantic Ocean, particularly by opening up the trans-Atlantic community to Latin America and Western Africa, and promoting a strategic relationship with regional, sub-regional and national partners of the two sub-continents. Setting up a broader, “Pan-Atlantic” community, associating the northern with the southern hemisphere, can make a key in the economic and geopolitical future of the EU.

• What is the Atlantic policy of the EU?
• Is the Atlantic space capable of provide the EU's energy needs?
• With the European strategic autonomy project, what relationship will the EU have with the regional and sub-regional organizations of the South Atlantic?
• Does EU need to extend the transatlantic alliance to Latin America and Western Africa?
• The Indo-Pacific space is in the process of becoming the new center of world gravity at the expense of the Atlantic space. What place will the Atlantic occupy in the future of the EU's strategic posture?

Contemporary international relations are characterized by the Sino-American rivalry that shapes global geopolitics.

In this context, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as the world’s economic and geopolitical center of gravity at the expense of the Atlantic space, in which established and rising powers compete with each other. While East Asia’s and especially China’s economic growth has become a major driving force of global change, developed countries struggle to readjust their social, economic and political institutions to the challenges of financial crises, shrinking populations, and the rising demand for and costs of social welfare.

Yet, debates about a power shift toward Asia and the decline of the West, remain ambiguous if not contradictory regarding the questions what this decline entails. Further, both Africa and Asia have a long history of troubled or inequal treaties or alliance with the West. As Africa, is search of strategic autonomy, seeks to redefine its role and responsibilities in global affairs and global balances, the continent with an Atlantic facade turned towards the West, and a Pacific facade turned towards Asia, finds itself at the intersection and forefront of these regional and global changes. This panel explores the connection Atlantic-Africa and Asia, and the place of Africa in the new balances between the Atlantic and the Indo-pacific spaces.

• What place occupies Africa in the new balances between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific space?
• Does emerging Asia complies with the needs of Africa?
• What form of cooperation can Asia offer to Africa?

Over the last fifteen years, the world has gone through a succession of crises of different nature: economic, geopolitical and sanitary. During these crises, women leaders have had unanimous appraisal regarding their sound leadership and their capacity to put their respective countries back on track. For instance, when Iceland suffered a severe banking crisis, in the aftermath of the subprimes financial shock, then-Prime minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir managed to bring the country out of the financial collapse by passing an emergency legislation that gave the financial authorities enough room to lead the banking system away from failure. Likewise, in Liberia, President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson oversaw the fight against the Ebola outbreak that hit the country in 2014, by deploying a massive emergency plan. Under her leadership, the country has managed to contain the spread of the virus and earned recognition from the international community. Furthermore, during the COVID-19 pandemic, countries such as Germany, Finland and New Zealand, under the respective leadership of Angela Merkel, Sanna Marin and Jacinda Aldern, followed an evidence-based approach, based on real-time data to give an appropriate response and manage the successive waves of infections. However, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war has put women in the “vulnerable” category, and at the formal decision-making level, the centralisation of power and increased role of the military has only made it more difficult for women to exert influence in political and administrative decision-making processes.

While it is true that over the past decade the share of women in leadership positions has been increasing over time, progress towards closing the gender gap has recently stalled in most countries, as women are still not being hired at equal rates across industries. In politics, men continue to outnumber women; women President and Prime Minister only account for 15% of the total of leaders around the world.

• Does gender play a significant role in defining a leader’s approach?
• Are crises a catalyst for increasing women’s leadership?
• How to tackle gender imbalances and stereotypes in leadership roles across all industries?
• How does the recurrence of crises affect women’s path to leadership?

Trade is not gender neutral as women and men are impacted differently due to differences in economic representation in terms of recognition for their contributions and due to various social inequalities. While Intra-African trade can serve as a catalyst to promote gender equality by improving financial inclusion for women and youth in the continent, Africa’s major customs unions and free trade agreements still do not cover the full range of trading possibilities on the continent likely to help increase youth and woman participation in trade policies. Promoting youth-led initiatives and gender equality is fundamental to achieve sustainable economic and social development and should be mainstreamed into the new Africa’s trade agenda. The AfCFTA is a giant market that could bring the continent together to increase productivity, create more jobs and therefore offers opportunities for gender equality, as women and youth inclusion is crucial in trade liberalization.

This session will assess where African countries stand in terms of women and youth inclusion in trade policies.

• What is the pace of policy implementation to operationalize the AfCFTA Agreement and how governments are mainstreaming gender and youth into these strategies to ensure that these groups can leverage the transformative potential of trade expansion? 
• What are the efforts engaged to equip woman and youth with the appropriate skills, technology and resources that would enable them to benefit from trade liberalization in Africa?
• What resources available to put in place for women and youth-owned companies to increase their effective participation and engagement in trade processes to overcome the current overlapping trade rules?

We live in an era where there are digitalization and datafication of the economic activity in the global space, and developing world is not the exception. Examples are the proliferation of e-trade platforms and the increasing use of Blockchain and distributed ledger technology. These applications of new digital technologies are finding innovative uses in many domains, including in social and economic areas as well as for environment. Still, an enabling digital framework is a necessary condition for the attainment of the potential that new digital technologies are offering - that is an open market where everyone connect and exchange with everyone. On this last point, progress is far from being uniform both among markets and among areas (countries and regions). In fact, some new digital technologies are well established, in particular the use of Blockchain and distributed ledger technology in finance related to other areas. Similarly, inequalities are still persisting between spaces in the matters of access to and use of information and communication technologies. Against this background, a set of questions seems to arise:

• How pertinent for development different types of new digital technologies, actors and ecosystems? 
• How new digital technologies could impact the Sustainable Development Goals?
• What challenges are governments facing and how new digital technologies solutions could contribute to their national development priorities? What about developing economies and Africa?

عادة ما تستأثر الهجرة غير النظامية بالاهتمام عندما يتعلق الأمر بدراسة دينامية الحركية في حوض البحر الأبيض المتوسط، على اعتبار ان هذا الفضاء

تحول الى مجال لهجرة الشباب القادم من دول الجنوب والذي يطمح الي تحقيق مستويات عيش أحسن في بلدان الشمال. لكن التركيز على الهجرة غير النظامية

لا يجب ان يحجب النظر عن نوع آخر من الهجرة التي تتعلق بانتقال كفاآت الجنوب الى دول الشمال. اذ بات هذا المعطى يؤثر بشكل سلبي على تنمية بلدان

المنشأ التي تستثمر في تكوين الشباب المؤهل في مجالات حيوية كالطب والهندسة، والذي ينتهي به المطاف في سوق الشغل الاوروبية التي تسعى لاستقطاب

الكافآت العالية، عبر برامج الهجرة الانتقائية، التي من شأنها استنزاف الموارد البشرية الافريقية، في ضل انعدام مقاربة شمولية في هذ ا السيا ق .

في ظل هذه المعطيات، بات من الواجب طرح تساؤلات حول مسببات وتداعيات ظاهرة هجرة الكفاآ ت :

• ما هي العوامل ا لاجتماعية والاقتصادية وراء هجرة الادمغة ؟
• كيف يمكن التعامل مع الظاهرة للحد من تداعياتها على النسيج الاجتماعي والاقتصاد ي لدول المنشأ ؟
• كيف يمكن التعزيز من تنافسية دول المنشأ وجعلها قادرة على استقطاب والحفاض على الكفاآت العالية ؟

The last two years brought economic and security challenges that have tremendously impacted the lives of people throughout the world. The COVID-19 pandemic as well as security concerns in parts of Africa and the ongoing war in Ukraine have hindered development prospects. Funds dedicated to implement projects for human development were suddenly directed towards the mitigation of the ongoing mixed crisis’ effects. As a result, priorities have temporarily shifted from the long-term goals of poverty reduction and sustainable development, to developing quick responses to the multifaceted crisis. The latter has not only revealed the scale of economic and social vulnerabilities of developing countries, but also disrupted the path of poverty reduction which slowed for the first time in 25 years. Amid this challenging context, old questions persist, and new concerns arise.

• How can governments/International institutions and local actors contribute to building resilience in an ever-evolving context?
• How can existing patterns of human mobility, often perceived as a threat be turned into real opportunities for prosperity sharing and joint human development?
• What role for development aid in building resilience in face of growing mixed crisis?

The world is now facing another state of polycrisis with heightened geopolitical risks, climate change and a non-negligeable risk of recurrent pandemics. Beyond their economic and social impact, these factors affect the sustainability of the shared public goods within the area of the Wider Atlantic. While the consequences of these crises are likely to be broadly felt among all the countries, the human and economic burdens are likely to fall on South Atlantic countries. In Africa, rising temperatures are endangering the on-going efforts to achieve a sustainable path for development and will have impacts for migration and regional stability. In Latin America, deforestation and the exposure to recurrent natural disasters pose a threat to the wildlife, with the possibility of the emergence of new zoonotic illnesses. In face of these factors, there is an urgent need to find a multilateral response to upgrade the resilience of countries in the Atlantic basin and find a sustainable path away from these looming risks.

• What means of cooperation can be put in place to balance the burden of this polycrisis?
• Is it possible to shape a new multilateral framework around the Atlantic global commons?
• What are the tools that can be implemented to ensure resilience in face of uncertainty?

Despite the increased supply and demand for climate finance globally, a thorny challenge remains: climate finance is not being unlocked fast enough to protect society's future. Between now and 2050, governments worldwide, and the private sector, are expected to need USD 131 trillion in investments for energy transition. In 2019, global climate finance flows were estimated to be roughly USD 622 billion. What’s more, climate funds, such as the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds, are disbursing funds for adaptation and mitigation at rates as low as 19% and 12%, respectively. Meanwhile, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are projected to rebound and grow by 5% in 2021, marking the largest increase since 2009. To combat the worst impacts of climate change and limit global warming in this century, the international community should not only scale up commitments to climate finance, but also identify and apply strategies for accelerating disbursement.

What are the structural challenges to climate finance disbursement?
What areas of adaptation or mitigation should climate finance prioritize?
Do financial institutions and central banks have a role to play in shaping up climate action and unlocking climate finance?